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 Abstract 
The functional-cognitive framework for psychological research implies that functional and 
cognitive researchers operate at two separate but mutually supportive levels of explanation. 
From a functional-cognitive perspective, all applied psychologists are ultimately directed at 
the functional level but they can differ in the way they conduct functional research and the 
degree to which they seek guidance from cognitive models. We propose a taxonomy that 
encompasses four different types of applied psychology and evaluate the merits of each type. 
We also argue that applied psychology can be fortified by strengthening its functional core, 
thus evolving into a more integrated but still diverse discipline of psychological engineering. 
Finally, we explore the implications of these ideas for applied memory research. 
 
Keywords: functional psychology, cognitive psychology, levels of explanation 
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Psychological Engineering:  
A Functional-Cognitive Perspective on Applied Psychology 
In a recent paper, Hughes, De Houwer, and Perugini (2016) likened the current state 
of psychological science to an archipelago of islands, each home to a different “tribe” of 
researchers. The members of the various tribes differ not only with regard to the topics that 
they study (e.g., psychopathology, social behavior, …) but also with regard to the approach 
that they adopt when studying these topics. Generally speaking, communication between the 
different islands is limited. This is particularly the case for two groups of islands, one group 
that adopts a cognitive approach and a second group that adopts a functional approach. The 
cognitive approach has dominated psychology for about half a century now. It aims to 
uncover mental mechanisms, that is, the way in which organisms process information (see 
Bechtel, 2008; Gardner, 1987). The functional approach, on the other hand, can be linked to 
behaviorism, at least certain forms of behaviorism such as radical behaviorism as it was 
introduced by B. F. Skinner (see Chiesa, 1992, 1994; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986) and to 
more recent scientific approaches such as contextual behavioral science (Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Wilson, 2012). Functional psychologists, as we will call them, are interested 
primarily in the environmental determinants of behavior, that is, in the way that behavior is a 
function of the (present and past) environment.1 
 The cognitive approach is often thought of as a reaction against and thus as 
incompatible with the functional approach. For instance, in a column about the state of 
behaviorism at the centenary of B. F. Skinner’s birth, Roediger (2004) cited Tulving who 
argued that “psychology now designates at least two rather different sciences, one of behavior 
                                                                 
1 We use the term “functional” in the mathematical sense of “function of” (i.e., behavior is a function of the 
environment) rather than in the teleological sense of “function for” (i.e., behavior serves a purpose). This also 
clarifies the distinction between functional psychology as we see it (i.e., the study of environment-behavior 
relations) and functional psychology as the approach adopted by a group of American psychologists (e.g., John 
Dewey) at the start of the 20th century.  
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and the other of the mind. They both deal with living creatures, like a number of other 
behavioral sciences, but their overlap is slim, probably no greater than psychology or 
sociology used to be when the world was young. No one will ever put the two psychologies 
together again, because their subject matter is different, interests are different, and their 
understanding of the kind of science they deal with is different. Most telling is the fact that 
the two species have moved to occupy different territories, they do not talk to each other (any 
more), and the members do not interbreed. This is exactly as it should be.” 
 The great divide between cognitive and functional approaches in psychology can also 
be seen in applied psychology. On the one hand, many applied psychologists are inspired by 
cognitive research and organized in societies such as the Society for Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition. On the other hand, there is a sizeable group of applied functional 
researchers who have their own organizations (e.g., Association for Behavior Analysis 
International, Association for Contextual Behavioral Science), meetings, and journals. Also 
in applied psychology, there is little evidence of communication between these cognitive and 
functional tribes. 
 In contrast to the position of scholars such as Tulving, in the present paper we argue 
that much can be gained from a closer interaction between cognitive and functional 
researchers, also in the domain of applied psychology. In a first section that provides the 
background for the rest of the paper, we summarize the work of De Houwer (2011) and 
Hughes et al. (2016) who (a) highlighted the fact that cognitive and functional approaches in 
psychology are not mutually exclusive but situated at different, mutually supportive levels of 
explanation and (b) distinguished two ways of doing functional research (i.e., effect-centric 
and analytic-abstractive). In the second section, we argue that all applied psychology is 
ultimately directed at the functional level of explanation. At the same time, four types of 
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applied psychology can be distinguished, including a new type that draws on both general 
functional principles and cognitive theories. In the third section, we evaluate the relative 
merits of the four types of applied psychology. In the fourth section, we explore one 
implication of the idea that all applied research is ultimately functional in nature: it entails 
that all applied researchers can communicate in functional terms. We discuss ways of 
promoting communication at the functional level so that applied psychology can evolve into a 
more integrated but still diverse discipline that could be referred to as “psychological 
engineering”. As such, we hope to provide the blueprint of a future for applied psychology in 
which the divide between different islands in the psychological archipelago is bridged and 
communication is not only possible but routine.  
 Before we start, we would like to point out that the central argument of the paper is 
inherently abstract in that it is not tied down to specific research topics. Applied psychology 
covers many areas of research, ranging from applied memory research, engineering 
psychology, and industrial-organizational psychology, to the psychology of educational tests 
and measurement. The primary distinction between these different areas of applied 
psychology concerns the topic that is addressed (e.g., memory, the way humans interact with 
the physical world, the selection of employees, assessment of educational skills). In this 
paper, we do not single out specific topics within applied psychology but focus on the 
approaches that applied researchers adopt when studying a certain topic (i.e., the functional 
and cognitive approach and how they relate to each other). As such, we hope that the present 
paper provides the necessary starting point for the deployment of the functional-cognitive 
framework in a wide range of areas of applied psychology. Nevertheless, in order to illustrate 
what the functional-cognitive framework could mean for specific areas of applied 
psychology, we included a section at the end of the paper in which we discuss some of the 
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implications of the framework for a research area that is at the core of this journal (i.e., 
applied memory research).  
The Functional-Cognitive Framework for Psychological Research: The Cognitive and 
Functional Approaches in Psychology are Situated at Two Separate but Mutually 
Supportive Levels of Explanation 
 The present paper builds on the functional-cognitive framework for psychological 
research that was first described by De Houwer (2011; see Hughes et al., 2016, for an update; 
see Bechtel, 2005, for similar ideas). At the core of this framework lies the idea that the 
functional and cognitive approaches in psychology are situated at two separate but mutually 
supportive levels of explanation. Within the functional level of explanation, behavior is 
explained in terms of the (current or past) environment and the way organisms interact with 
the environment. For instance, the fact that a dog salivates upon hearing a bell could be 
attributed to the prior pairing of the bell and food (Pavlov, 1927). Whereas functional 
explanations identify which events in the environment influence behavior, cognitive 
explanations specify how those events influence behavior. More specifically, cognitive 
explanations describe the mental (i.e., information processing) mechanisms by which events 
in the environment influence behavior (Bechtel, 2008; Gardner, 1987). For instance, one 
could argue that the pairing of bell and food leads to associations in memory via which 
subsequent presentations of the bell can activate the mental representation of the food, which 
in its turn leads to salivation (e.g., Rescorla, 1988).  
 The idea that the functional and cognitive approaches are situated at different levels of 
explanation has implications for understanding the relation between the two approaches. 
First, it implies that they are not mutually exclusive. Rather than being rivals that compete to 
achieve the same goal, the two approaches can co-exist because they are directed at different 
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goals, that is, at answering different questions. More specifically, they involve a different 
explanandum (that which is to be explained) and explanans (that which explains). Whereas 
the functional level aims to explain behavior (e.g., salivation) in terms of events in the 
environment (e.g., stimulus pairings), the cognitive level aims to explain the impact of the 
environment on behavior (e.g., impact of pairings on salivation) in terms of mediating mental 
mechanisms (e.g., formation of associations in memory).  
There are valid reasons for adopting each type of goal. Functional researchers focus 
on environment-behavior relations because it allows them to predict-and-influence behavior 
(Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Hayes et al., 2012). Whereas prediction can be achieved by 
verifying the presence of events in the environment (e.g., after observing pairings of bell and 
food, one can predict that the bell will start to evoke salivation), influence over behavior can 
be realized by manipulating the environment (e.g.,  by actively adding bell-food pairings to 
the environment). Hence, for functional researchers, it is not necessary to go beyond the 
analysis of environment-behavior relations. Cognitive researchers, on the other hand, do not 
want to stop at the functional level. For them, explanations are satisfactory only when 
mediating mental mechanisms have been identified. For instance, a functional explanation of 
changes in salivation responses (e.g., the bell starts to elicit salivation because of the bell-
food pairings) does not specify the mechanism that mediates these changes (e.g., that bell-
food pairings cause changes in salivation because they lead to bell-food associations in 
memory). This sense of lack of understanding can motivate researchers to search for 
mediating mechanisms. Because of their focus on mechanisms, cognitive researchers often 
think of functional explanations as mere descriptions of to-be-explained phenomena rather 
than as a explanations in their own right. This is why, in general, they tend to see little merit 
in functional research as such, that is, in functional research that is stripped of its implications 
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for mental mechanisms. Note, however, that this particular perspective on the lack of merit of 
functional explanations stems from the goals that cognitive psychologists adopt. 
A central aspect of the functional-cognitive framework is that it “does not interfere 
with the goals of a researcher, nor does it pass judgment on those goals or the reasons behind 
those goals” (Hughes et al., 2016, p. 7). There is no simple way of deciding which level of 
explanation is most important or worthy of attention. Such decisions can be informed only by 
the overarching, pre-analytic aims of the researcher, which ultimately find their ground in 
values and philosophical positions that are difficult to evaluate or compare on objective 
grounds (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Hayes et al., 2012). Within the functional-cognitive 
framework, both approaches are regarded as having unique scientific merit, thus defusing 
past discussions about scientific supremacy (see Reyna, 1995, for an example of such 
discussions).    
 The functional-cognitive framework not only allows the functional and cognitive 
approaches to co-exist, it also highlights that they are mutually supportive. In other words, 
interactions between the functional and cognitive approaches are not only possible but also 
potentially beneficial for each approach separately. On the one hand, we believe that 
functional researchers can benefit from cognitive models (i.e., models of mental mechanisms) 
as well as cognitively- inspired research because it can help them to identify influential 
environmental determinants of behavior. For instance, cognitive theories of classical 
conditioning have resulted in novel insights about the conditions under which stimulus 
pairings (e.g., of bell and food) results in behavioral change (e.g., salivation; see Bouton, 
2016, and Rescorla, 1988, for reviews; also see Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 2016, for a 
discussion of what functional researchers can and cannot gain from interacting with cognitive 
researchers). On the other hand, functional research can help cognitive researchers. Because 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 9 
functional research generates insights about the environmental determinants of behavior (e.g., 
under which conditions does classical conditioning occur), it can help constrain the 
development of cognitive models of the mental mechanisms by which the environment 
influences behavior (see De Houwer, 2011, and Hughes et al., 2016, for more details).  
 There is, however, an imbalance in the relation between functional and cognitive 
approaches. Whereas the functional approach might benefit from cognitive models, it can 
operate also in the absence of such models (Chiesa, 1994). More specifically, it is possible to 
discover the environmental determinants of behavior even in the absence of models of mental 
mechanisms. The cognitive approach, on the other hand, always needs to be grounded in 
functional research (also see Fiedler, 2016). Because information is non-physical (Wiener, 
1961), it is not possible for researchers (as physical beings) to observe or interact with 
information directly (Gardner, 1987). For instance, one cannot directly observe mental 
representations of bells and food, nor associations between these representations in 
memory. 2  
Researchers can make inferences about mental mechanisms only by studying how the 
environment is related to behavior, that is, by engaging in functional research. This is exactly 
why cognitive researchers conduct empirical research in which they observe or manipulate 
situations and examine how these situations relate to observable behavior (see also Roediger, 
2004).  
 The idea that cognitive research is necessarily functional in nature is not trivial when 
considered from the perspective of the functional-cognitive framework. First, it highlights the 
fact that by doing research, cognitive psychologists can contribute not only to the cognitive 
level of explanation (i.e., knowledge about mental mechanisms) but also to the functional 
                                                                 
2 One can observe neurons and dendrites in the brain but the exact relation between neural and mental events is 
often unclear (see Vahey & Whelan, 2016, for a functional-cognitive perspective on cognitive neuroscience). 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 10 
level of explanation (i.e., knowledge of environment-behavior relations) and thus to the goal 
of predicting and influencing behavior. Hence, it provides a reason for functional researchers 
to look closely at cognitive research and gives an extra dimension of relevance to cognitive 
research.  
Second, the idea that cognitive research is necessarily functional also sheds new light 
on the well-known problem of the use of proxies in cognitive research. Because mental 
processes cannot be observed directly, cognitive researchers sometimes treat the presence of 
a behavioral effect (e.g., classical conditioning) as equivalent to the presence of a mental 
process (e.g., association formation; De Houwer, 2011). The use of proxies is grounded in 
functional research because it depends on the detection of behavioral effects (i.e.,  
environment-behavior relations). However, it confounds the functional and cognitive levels 
by assuming a one-to-one link between behavioral effects and mental processes. 
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that there are one-to-one relations between behavioral 
effects and mental processes (De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013). For instance, it has recently been argued that many instances of classical conditioning 
rely on the formation of conscious propositional beliefs rather than simple associations 
(Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). If this is true, then classical conditioning effects 
cannot be used as proxies of association formation. More generally, the use of behavioral 
proxies of mental processes relies on a priori assumptions about how the functional 
(behavioral effects) and cognitive level (mental processes) are related. Because there often is 
little independent support for these a priori assumptions, there is a considerable risk that a 
priori assumptions are incorrect and thus that the proxies are invalid (De Houwer, 2011). We 
therefore believe that cognitive psychology would benefit from a clear separation between the 
functional and cognitive levels of explanation. This starts by defining behavioral phenomena 
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in purely functional terms, that is, without using mental concepts. For instance, when 
classical conditioning is defined functionally as the impact of stimulus pairings on behavior, 
no assumptions are made about the mental processes that mediate the effect (De Houwer, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013). Defining behavioral effects in purely functional terms not 
only maximizes theoretical freedom but also promotes cumulative science. For instance, a 
functional definition of classical conditioning allows for both propositional and associative 
cognitive theories and an uninterrupted buildup of knowledge about the moderators of 
classical conditioning even when ideas about the mechanisms that mediate classical 
conditioning change (see De Houwer, 2011, for more details). 
 When viewed from the perspective of the functional-cognitive framework, the idea 
that cognitive research is necessarily functional in nature also has a third implication: It 
allows one to see that functional and cognitive researchers tend to conduct functional 
research in different ways.  In the final paragraphs of this section, we briefly describe these 
two functional approaches that can be characterized as analytic-abstractive and effect-centric 
(Hughes et al., 2016). We devote quite a bit of space to this distinction because we believe it 
is has important implications also for applied psychology in general, implications that we will 
discuss in the next section.  
Like most scientists, functional researchers (i.e., researchers whose aim is to 
determine the environmental causes of behavior) look for general principles that can be 
applied across a range of situations. They do so by adopting an analytical-abstractive 
functional approach that looks for commonalities between individual environment-behavior 
relations in terms of the roles (i.e., functions) of the stimuli and responses that are involved in 
those relations. For instance, both the lever pressing of a rat in a Skinner box as well as the 
tantrum of a small child at home can be described as instances of the general functional 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 12 
principle of reinforcement. All instances of reinforcement have in common that the 
probability of a behavior (also called the response; e.g., lever pressing; tantrums) is 
influenced by its consequences (also called the reinforcer; e.g., food;  prolonged interactions 
with parents). Moreover, the extent to which response probability is a function of the 
behavior-consequence relation can be moderated by a number of factors, including the 
presence of stimuli (so-called discriminative stimuli) that signal situations in which the 
response will or will not be followed by the consequence. A functional analysis of a 
particular situation is considered to be valid if it allows the researcher to predict-and-
influence the behavior (e.g., increase lever pressing by strengthening the relation between 
lever pressing and food; reduce the frequency of tantrums by instructing a parent to ignore 
the child when it has a tantrum). 
Cognitive researchers also look for general principles but they do so at the level of 
mental mechanisms. They try to identify mental structures (e.g., working memory), processes 
(e.g., attentional engagement), and representations (e.g., attitudes) that determine behavior in 
a range of situations. For instance, working memory is assumed to be involved in both 
calculus (e.g., dividing 214 by 9) and addiction (Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012). Likewise, 
attitudes toward smoking could influence a whole range of behaviors (e.g., buying cigarettes, 
interacting with smokers; Wiers et al., 2007). Because cognitive researchers can achieve 
abstraction at the level of mental mechanisms, it is less essential for them to also look for 
abstraction at the functional level. Hence, effects of the environment on behavior are often 
described in terms of surface (i.e., topographical) features (e.g., the Stroop color-word effect 
as an effect described by J. R. Stroop that involves colors and words). Because each effect 
has unique surface features, different effects tend to be studied in isolation, leading to 
cognitive models that are designed specifically to account for a particular effect or small 
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groups of effects (Meiser, 2011). 3 Sometimes, it is even assumed on an a priori basis that a 
single mental process accounts for a specific effect, as is the case when effects are used as 
proxies for mental processes (see above). In sum, within the cognitive approach, functional 
research is often effect-centric, that is, focused on individual effects that are described on the 
basis of surface features.  
Although the effect-centric functional approach has potential advantages, it also has 
downsides. For instance, it tends to result in a fractionated research landscape where there is 
little interaction between researchers who study different effects (see Meiser, 2011, for an in 
depth discussion of this problem). The functional-cognitive framework highlights that the 
problems associated with an effect-centric functional approach can be reduced by engaging in 
more analytic-abstractive functional research. This offers cognitive researchers the possibility 
of linking different types of effects without having to make a priori assumptions about the 
mental processes that are involved in the different effects (see Hughes et al., 2016, for a more 
detailed discussion). For instance, Liefooghe and De Houwer (2016) pointed out that many 
pivotal behavioral effects in cognitive psychology such as the Stroop effect, Simon effect, 
and Task-Rule Congruency effect can all be conceptualized as instances of the abstract 
functional principle of stimulus control. That is, all these effects involve operant responses 
(i.e., responses that are emitted because of their consequences) whose properties are 
influenced by the presence discriminative stimuli. Based on this analysis, Liefooghe and De 
Houwer discovered new links between seemingly different phenomena. Although the 
                                                                 
3 Note, however, that descriptions in terms of surface features often do entail some degree of abstraction. For 
instance, effects can be referred to as Stroop color-word effects independent of the specific colors that are 
involved. Such abstraction at the structural level (i.e., at the level of the physical components of stimuli and 
behavior) can vary in degree depending on how abstractly structural components are described. For instance, the 
concept “environmental regularity” (De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2013) provides a highly abstract 
structural description of the spatio-temporal properties of events in that it focuses on spatio-temporal 
components but ignores many other physical components (see De Houwer & Hughes, in press, for a more 
detailed discussion). 
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analytic-abstractive functional approach implies that more resources are directed at analyzing 
environment-behavior relations, it does not stop cognitive researchers from examining the 
mental mechanisms that mediate those environment-behavior relations. On the contrary, 
because the cognitive approach must be grounded in functional research, more sophistication 
at the functional level is bound to lead to more sophistication at the cognitive level (De 
Houwer, 2011; Hughes et al., 2016).  
To summarize, in this section, we argued that the functional and cognitive approaches 
in psychology are situated at two levels of explanation that address different scientific 
questions. Because both types of questions are fundamentally different, there is no need for 
rivalry between the two approaches. Instead, both approaches can strengthen each other. 
Although the cognitive approach necessarily involves functional research, it tends to adopt an 
effect-centric rather than an analytic-abstractive approach. Because an exclusively effect-
centric approach has certain downsides, cognitive researchers can benefit from adopting a 
more analytic-abstractive functional approach, that is, from linking their research with 
general functional principles such as reinforcement and stimulus control.  
On the Nature of Applied Psychology 
As we noted earlier, also within the archipelago of applied psychology, some islands 
are inhabited by functional researchers whereas others are home to cognitively- inspired 
researchers. At the functional side, applied functional researchers scrutinize various kinds of 
real-life phenomena by linking them with general functional principles such as reinforcement. 
This approach has been successfully adopted in applied research on a wide range of 
phenomena such as autism, phobias, addiction, parenting, and education  (see Cooper, Heron, 
& Heward, 2007, and Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, Zettle,  & Biglan, 2016, for reviews). At the 
cognitive side, researchers have put forward cognitive models of important societal and 
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behavioral problems such as addiction (e.g., Wiers et al., 2007) and depression (e.g., De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010). By shedding light on the mental processes involved in these 
behaviors, these models clarify which mental processes have to be changed in order to alter 
behavior. As such, they orient cognitively- inspired applied psychologists toward the 
development of interventions that target specific mental processes (see Kinderman & Tsai, 
2007, for a clear example of such an approach in clinical psychology). Cognitive bias 
modification (e.g., Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Koster & Bernstein, 2015; MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 2012) and working memory training (e.g., Shipstead et al., 2012) are just two of 
the many cognitive interventions that have received considerable attention in recent years.  
One could argue, however, that all applied researchers ultimately operate within the 
functional level of explanation. First of all, as we argued above, even cognitive research is 
ultimately functional in the sense that it deals with environment-behavior relations. Second, 
by its very nature, applied psychology is directed at solving practical problems. Whereas 
strictly speaking, theoretical cognitive psychologists can strive to uncover mental 
mechanisms for its own sake (i.e., to achieve a sense of fully understanding a phenomenon), 
for cognitively-oriented applied researchers, knowledge about mental mechanisms is a means 
toward an end. From this perspective, one could even argue that cognitively- inspired applied 
psychologists already adhere to the functional-cognitive framework that we described in the 
previous section: They use insights from the cognitive level to enrich their search for ways to 
predict and influence behavior (see Appendix 1 for a discussion of two possible objections 
against this conclusion). 
 In addition to the proposal that all applied researchers ultimately operate within the 
functional level of explanation, a functional-cognitive perspective also reveals different types 
of applied research. First, we can distinguish between purely functional applied research and 
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applied research that is cognitively- inspired. Both are directed at the functional level but only 
the latter involves cognitive models as tools for inspiring functional research. Second, in the 
previous section of our paper, we described two ways of conducting functional research: 
effect-centric and analytic-abstractive. Combining both distinctions produces a taxonomy that 
encompasses four types of applied research (see Table 1): purely functional analytic-
abstractive (PFAA), purely functional effect-centric (PFEC), cognitively- inspired analytic-
abstractive (CIAA), and cognitively- inspired effect-centric (CIEC). Although we present the 
taxonomy in categorical terms for presentational purposes, one should conceive of both 
distinctions as the end points of two dimensions, one that codes the degree to which effects 
are analyzed in an analytic-abstractive manner (i.e., the degree to which general functional 
principles are used as a source of inspiration) and one that codes the degree to which 
cognitive theories are used as inspiration for research.  
 
Table 1 
 A Taxonomy of Types of Applied Psychology 
    Effect-centric   Analytic-abstractive 
 
Purely Functional       PFEC    PFAA 
Cognitively inspired       CIEC    CIAA 
 
 
PFAA research is typically conducted by applied functional researchers who analyze 
target behaviors in terms of general functional principles such as reinforcement without 
taking into account possible mediating mental mechanisms (e.g., Cooper et al., 2007; Hayes 
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et al., 2016). Much of the cognitively- inspired applied research, on the other hand, would 
qualify as effect-centric (i.e., CIEC). As is the case in cognitive research more generally, in 
CIEC research, behavioral effects are often treated as proxies for mental processes (e.g., 
memory span as a proxy for working memory capacity; see Shipstead et al., 2012). Likewise, 
interventions are often described in terms of the mental process that they are assumed to 
target (e.g., attentional bias training or working memory training). In other words, CIEC 
research makes little use of general functional principles but is inspired by cognitive theories. 
PFEC research, on the other hand, draws neither on functional principles nor on cognitive 
theories. Instead, researchers primarily focus on a particular relationship between 
environment and behavior (e.g., accuracy of eyewitness testimonies) and the moderators of 
those effects (e.g., the way lineups are organized). CIAA research, finally, is inspired by both 
cognitive theories and general functional principles. From a purely logical point of view, one 
might think that this type of research would be very popular because it maximizes the sources 
from which inspiration can be drawn. At present, however, there are few if any examples of 
this type of research in the applied psychology literature. We believe that CIAA research has 
not yet caught on in large part because of the troubled relation between functional and 
cognitive psychology. The functional-cognitive framework reveals, however, that it is 
possible to bridge these two approaches and thus puts CIAA research on the map as a viable 
and promising avenue for applied researchers.  
To summarize, in this section, we have argued that applied researchers operate at the 
functional level of explanation. One can, however, distinguish between different types of 
applied research (PFEC, PFAA, CIEC, CIAA). In the remainder of this paper, we discuss a 
number of implications of this functional-cognitive perspective on applied psychology. First, 
we discuss the relative merits of the different types of applied research. Second, we explore 
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the implications of the idea that all applied research is ultimately directed at the functional 
level. Third, we illustrate what it means to adopt a functional-cognitive framework by 
deploying the framework in the area of applied memory research. 
On the Merits of Different Types of Applied Research 
From the perspective of the functional-cognitive framework, it is possible not only to 
distinguish different types of applied research but also to compare the relative benefits of the 
various types. We present such a comparison in this section, starting with and focusing on 
CIEC research because this type of research is arguably most typical for this journal. 
Cognitively-Inspired Effect-Centric Research in Applied Psychology 
As we noted in the first part of our paper, there are a number of risks attached to 
effect-centric cognitive research, primarily as the result of the frequent use of behavioral 
effects as proxies of mental processes. In the following paragraphs, we describe research on 
attentional bias modification (see MacLeod & Mathews, 2012, for a review) to illustrate that 
these problems could also threaten CIEC research in applied psychology.  
Cognitive researchers (e.g., Franken, 2003; Mathews, & MacLeod, 2002; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) have argued that important behavioral problems (e.g., 
addiction) are in part due to a bias in orienting attention to certain stimuli (e.g., alcohol 
related cues). Because of these claims, training procedures were developed to stop people 
from orienting to those stimuli (see MacLeod & Mathews, 2012, for a review). One such 
procedure is based on the dot probe task. In this task, two pictures are presented briefly side 
by side. Immediately after the pictures disappear, a dot appears on the prior location of one of 
the pictures. Participants are asked to respond to the dot. The logic behind the task is that 
participants respond faster to a dot when they already attend to the location where the dot 
appears. Hence, if the dot appears at a location of a picture that draws attention, responding 
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will be fast. Initially, dot probe effects were used as proxies for attentional vigilance, also by 
applied (clinical and health) researchers (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; see Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998, for a review). Later on, however, it became clear that dot probe effects 
might reflect not only a tendency to direct attention towards a picture (i.e., attentional 
vigilance or engagement) but also a difficulty in redirecting attention away from that picture 
(i.e., attentional disengagement; see Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2001). Despite efforts to 
disentangle the two processes (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), 
doubts continued to be raised about whether (components of) dot probe effects or related 
effects can provide a valid index of attentional engagement or attentional disengagement 
(e.g., Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). Nevertheless, many researchers continued to 
use (components of) dot probe effects as proxies for attentional engagement or 
disengagement, probably because the distinction between these two attentional processes is 
vital in many cognitive models (e.g., De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
Cognitively-inspired applied researchers also developed interventions on the basis of 
the dot probe task. For instance, in order to train people not to attend certain stimuli (e.g., 
train a heavy drinker not to attend alcohol related cues), the dot probe task can be arranged in 
such a way that the dot appears most often at the location opposite to the location of those 
stimuli (i.e., mostly incongruent trials). These kinds of attentional bias modification training 
have been studied extensively in clinical and health psychology (see Koster & Bernstein, 
2015, and MacLeod & Matthews, 2012, for reviews). Research using these procedures 
qualifies as CIEC research in that it is inspired by cognitive models about the role of attention 
in behavior and describes interventions in terms of surface features (i.e., tasks involving dot 
probes) and categorizes them in terms of mental processes (i.e., attention modification) rather 
than general functional principles (e.g., reinforcement). 
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The example of attentional bias modification training nicely illustrates the risks of 
CIEC research. In line with the current uncertainty about dot probe effects as a proxy of 
attentional engagement, it is not clear which mental processes are altered as the result of dot-
probe-based training procedures. For instance, it is possible that participants learn to quickly 
disengage their attention from the crucial pictures rather than not to shift their attention to 
those picture. Because disengagement can be conceptualized as an escape response and 
because escape responses are known to exacerbate rather than solve clinical problems (e.g., 
Foa & Kozak, 1986), attentional bias training might thus also have negative effects (Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2014). It is also possible that participants learn to shift their attention 
toward the crucial pictures because the location of those pictures is a reliable predictor of the 
location of the dot probe (i.e., the dot probe is likely to appear at the opposite location of the 
crucial picture; Spruyt & Van Bockstaele, 2013). Moreover, different people might be 
influenced in different ways. In hindsight, the fact that dot-probe-based attentional bias 
modification training can have multiple, possibly opposing effects might explain why this 
type of training turned out to be fairly unsuccessful (see Koster & Bernstein, 2015, for a 
recent evaluation). 
Finally, research on attentional bias modification training also illustrates another 
problem with cognitively- inspired applied research that we have not yet touched upon. In 
order for cognitive models to be useful tools for applied researchers, the models need to be 
clear, coherent, and (to some extent) correct. Although accidental discoveries are always 
possible, it seems unlikely that cognitive models will orient applied researchers toward 
practical solutions for practical problems if (a) it is not clear what the model is about, (b) it is 
not clear what it predicts, or (c) it provides a poor model of the mental mechanisms that 
underlie behavior. From this perspective, it is disconcerting to see that there is still substantial 
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disagreement about how one should conceptualize attention (e.g., Anderson, 2011) and 
whether attentional processes actually contribute in a causal way to behavioral problems such 
as anxiety disorders (e.g., Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). 
In sum, the functional-cognitive framework not only allows us to specify the nature of 
CIEC research but also to identify and help understand the problems that are associated with 
this popular approach in applied psychology.  
Purely Functional Effect-Centric Research in Applied Psychology 
What about PFEC applied research? In this type of research, effects are defined only 
on the basis of surface features such as the type of stimuli that are involved or the type of 
responses that are observed (e.g., dot probe effects), without making any assumptions about 
underlying mental processes (e.g., attention). On the one hand, some of the risks of CIEC 
research (e.g., those resulting from the use of proxies of mental processes) can be mitigated 
by engaging in PFEC research. On the other hand, the scientific merit of a PFEC approach is 
limited by the fact that, in the absence of cognitive models or general functional principles, 
there is little basis for generalizing knowledge from one situation to another situation. Of 
course, from a purely pragmatic point of view, it does not matter whether solutions for a 
problem can be conceptualized abstractly in terms of mental processes or general functional 
principles. What counts most for applied researchers is that problems get solved. 
Nevertheless, because there is nothing to orient researchers except surface features, a PFEC 
approach is likely to progress in a slow, haphazard manner. This is why we believe that 
progress in applied psychology as a systematic endeavor might be hampered if researchers 
conduct only PFEC research. 
Purely Functional Analytic-Abstractive Research in Applied Psychology 
We see more merit in purely functional analytic-abstractive applied research because 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 22 
it can draw upon a vast source of knowledge about general functional principles (e.g., 
Catania, 2013) as guidance for applied research. To fully understand the guidance that 
functional principles can offer, it is important to recall that functional principles provide 
potential explanations of behavior rather than mere descriptions. For instance, saying that the 
tantrums of a child are an instance of the principle of reinforcement provides one possible 
hypothesis for why those behaviors are there. More specifically, it implies that the tantrums 
depend on specific consequences that they had in the past (e.g., a prolonged interaction 
between the child and otherwise absent parents) rather than merely on eliciting stimuli in the 
present (e.g., physical discomfort). This explanation is theoretical in the sense that it involves 
the application of a general scientific principle (reinforcement). It is hypothetical in the sense 
that the appropriateness of the explanation cannot simply be observed but has to be 
substantiated by evidence (e.g., by showing that the tantrums dissipate when parents ignore 
the child when it has a tantrum and interact with the child more when it does not have a 
tantrum). It is also generative in that leads to testable new predictions. Predictions can be 
generated by transferring the knowledge that has been gathered about the general principle 
(e.g., reinforcement) to the specific behavior that is being studied (e.g., tantrums).  For 
instance, based on the fact that operant behavior is known to be more persistent when it has 
been reinforced only partially (i.e., when the behavior is followed by the reinforcer in some 
but not all cases; see Catania, 2013), one can predict that it will be more difficult to reduce 
tantrums in children whose tantrums only occasionally resulted in positive outcomes. As we 
noted earlier, an explanation in terms of functional principles does not, however, reveal the 
mechanisms underlying (instances of) those principles. For instance, an explanation in terms 
of reinforcement does not explain how the consequences of a behavior influence its frequency 
(e.g., how child-parent interactions during tantrums lead to more tantrums). For cognitive 
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psychologists, this is a crucial limitation, often leading to the complaint that functional 
explanations are circular at best (i.e., child-parent interaction is a reinforcer because it 
functions as a reinforcer). However, this cognitive perspective is blind to the fact that 
reinforcement is a functional principle that explains behavior (e.g., tantrums) in terms of the 
environment (e.g., child-parent interactions) rather than a mental mechanism that explains 
how the environment influences behavior. In sum, when taking a step back, it becomes clear 
that functional principles do offer explanations that are theoretical, hypothetical, and 
generative.  
Nevertheless, PFAA research misses out on the potential guidance that can be offered 
by cognitive theories. One of the markers of a good cognitive theory is its capacity to 
generate new ideas about potential moderators of behavioral phenomena (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2015). Cognitive theories can have predictive value even if they are ill-
specified and refer to constructs that are difficult to operationalize. To some extent, vague 
terms might even be inevitable, for instance, when dealing with phenomena that are poorly 
understood. One could even argue that the freedom of cognitive researchers to use theories 
and concepts that cannot be specified precisely allowed them to produce such a rich empirical 
literature on such a wide range of phenomena. Because the empirical evidence that is 
generated by cognitive researchers contributes to our understanding of environment-behavior 
relations, functional researchers can benefit from this literature even if they ignore cognitive 
theories and constructs. This is especially the case for important types of behavior that 
receive little attention in traditional functional research (e.g., brief and immediate responding; 
see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). In fact, Barnes-Holmes and Hussey (2016) 
argued that most of the added value of the functional-cognitive framework for functional 
researchers might be realized by putting them in contact with the paradigms used and topics 
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studied by cognitive researchers.  
Cognitively-Inspired Analytic-Abstractive Research in Applied Psychology 
For historical reasons, functional researchers might be reluctant to embrace input from 
cognitive psychology whereas cognitively-oriented applied researchers might see little merit 
in interacting with functional researchers. A central aim of our paper is to raise awareness 
about the fact that these historical divides can be overcome and that doing so could benefit 
applied psychology as a whole. From the perspective of the functional-cognitive framework 
(De Houwer, 2011; Hughes et al., 2016), applied researchers can be inspired by both 
cognitive models and general functional principles, as well as empirical research generated in 
both the functional and cognitive tradition. In other words, we believe that applied 
researchers can engage in CIAA research.  
In fact, there could well be a multiplier effect when cognitive and analytic-abstractive 
sources of guidance are combined. First, when a specific phenomenon or intervention can be 
linked with a more general functional principle, it allows one to utilize not only the functional 
knowledge about that general principle but also the cognitive models that have been 
developed to account for other instances of that general principle or the general principle 
itself. As such, it would reduce the need to develop separate cognitive models for the specific 
phenomenon or intervention and could even lead to the development of cognitive theories for 
classes of problems or interventions that are all instances of the same general functional 
principle. For instance, the fact that Liefooghe and De Houwer (2016) related both the Stroop 
effect and the Task-rule Congruency effect to the functional principle of stimulus control 
opens the way for general cognitive theories of stimulus control that might explain both 
Stroop and Task-rule Congruency effects. At the very least, a CIAA approach would 
stimulate cross-talk between cognitive research on different problems or interventions. This 
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would reduce not only fragmentation in applied research but also the probability that specific 
effects and interventions are used as proxies of (changes in) specific mental processes. In this 
way, CIAA research cannot only profit from the guidance of both general functional 
principles and cognitive models but will also be less susceptible to the risks entailed by the 
use of cognitive models in effect-centric research. 
To illustrate some of the benefits of CIAA research in applied psychology, let us 
return to the example of dot-probe-based attentional bias modification training. From a 
standard functional perspective (see Catania, 2013, for an overview), the dot probe task 
involves several operant contingencies. More specifically, a left dot signals that a left 
response is correct (Left: Press Left => Correct) whereas a right dot signals that a right 
response is correct (Right: Press Right => Correct). During a standard dot probe task, 
responding is typically under the control of the dot (i.e., the probability of pressing left and 
right depends on the location of the dot) but it is also controlled by the preceding pictures 
(i.e., speed and accuracy of responding depends on which picture is presented where). Hence, 
in functional analytic-abstractive terms, the dot probe effect can be conceptualized as an 
instance of stimulus control by task-irrelevant stimuli.  
Building on this analysis, research on dot-probe-based training procedures can be 
conceived of as research on changes in stimulus control by task-irrelevant stimuli, more 
specifically changes that are due to the strength of the contingency between features of the 
task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the pictures), on the one hand, and the task-relevant stimulus (i.e., 
the dot) or correct response (pressing the left or right key), on the other hand. We realize that 
for a cognitive researcher, this analysis is likely to be perceived as an awkward re-description 
of the dot probe effect and the purpose of dot-probe-based training. It is awkward because it 
is coined in terms unfamiliar to many cognitively- inspired researchers. It is also unlikely to 
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satisfy the scientific aims of cognitive researchers because, as a functional description of the 
effect, it does not refer to any mediating mental mechanisms that could explain the dot probe 
effect or the effects of training.  
Nevertheless, these kinds of functional analytic-abstractive descriptions can have 
merit for cognitively- inspired researchers. Because it is framed in terms of general functional 
principles, our description of the dot probe (training) effect makes contact with many other 
instances of stimulus control in animals (e.g., Escobar & Bruner, 2007) and humans (e.g., 
Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2016). For instance, it reveals a link between dot-probe-based 
training and proportion-congruency effects in Stroop studies (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008). 
From a functional analytic-abstractive perspective, both dot probe effects and Stroop effects 
qualify as instances of stimulus control by task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., picture location and 
words, respectively; Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2016). Moreover, both dot-probe-based 
training and proportion-congruency effects involve a manipulation of the contingency 
between task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., picture location; word) and task-relevant stimuli (i.e., dot 
location; ink color) or responses (e.g., pressing a left or right key; saying “blue” or “green”).  
On the basis of this functional analytic-abstractive re-description of dot-probe-based 
training and proportion-congruency effects in Stroop studies, a link can be made between the 
two literatures on these effects. More specifically, functional knowledge about proportion-
congruency effects in Stroop studies and cognitive models of these effects can be used to 
inspire research on dot-probe-based training. For instance, it has been demonstrated that 
proportion-congruency effects are highly stimulus-dependent (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008) 
suggesting that these effects are not due to conflict adaptation via changes in the deployment 
of attention to task-irrelevant stimuli. Instead, proportion-congruency effects have been 
explained by episodic memory models that operate solely on the basis of general principles of 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 27 
memory storage and retrieval (e.g., Schmidt, 2013). This functional and cognitive knowledge 
about proportion-congruency effects in Stroop tasks sheds new light on the fact that dot-
probe-based training effects show little transfer (i.e., also seem to be stimulus-specific; see 
Koster & Bernstein, 2015, for a review).  
Summary 
In this section, we discussed the relative merit of the four types of applied research 
that we identified in the previous section. Whereas PFEC research is limited as a systematic 
scientific endeavor, CIEC research faces a number of challenges, and PFAA misses out on 
possible guidance from cognitive models and research, a CIAA approach to applied 
psychology combines the best of both worlds (i.e., levels of explanation) and can thus 
maximize progress.  
Applied Psychology as Psychological Engineering 
 There are many barriers that hamper communication between applied psychologists. 
The functional-cognitive framework reveals ways to overcome these barriers and thus to 
increase the coherence of applied psychology. First, there is the historical divide between 
functional psychology (i.e., behaviorism) and cognitive psychology that we mentioned earlier 
and that still hinders contacts between functional applied researchers and cognitively- inspired 
applied researchers. The functional-cognitive framework shows that this is an illusory barrier. 
It is possible for functional and cognitive researchers to interact while maintaining their 
unique goals and approaches. Because the functional and cognitive approaches can be 
mutually supportive, increased communication between functional and cognitive researchers 
can be beneficial for all involved. Second, applied research is fractionated not only along the 
line of the approach that is adopted (functional, cognitive) but also along the line of the topics 
that are studied (addiction, eyewitness testimony, …). Based on the functional-cognitive 
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framework, we propose that unity and communication can be fostered by linking phenomena 
that are studied in various areas of applied psychology to a common set of general functional 
principles (e.g., reinforcement). Third, communication between applied psychologists is often 
hampered by the fact that different researchers use the same concepts at multiple levels of 
explanation (e.g., conditioning as an effect, as the mental process of forming associations in 
memory, or as the neural process of forming dendrites in the brain). The functional-cognitive 
framework can help solve this problem by encouraging researchers to separate different 
levels of explanation and by defining behavioral phenomena strictly in functional terms, 
preferably in terms of general functional principles.  
 In sum, the functional-cognitive framework suggests that communication between 
applied psychologists can be improved by adopting a common analytic-abstractive language 
that is phrased in terms of general functional principles. Analytic-abstractive concepts (a) can 
be used not only by functional researchers but also by cognitively-oriented applied 
psychologists without precluding the use of cognitive models (e.g., the Stroop effect as an 
instance of stimulus control; see Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2016), (b) are applicable to a wide 
range of practical problems and potential solutions (e.g., see our analysis of dot probe effects 
and dot probe training effects in terms of stimulus control), and (c) are purely functional and 
thus not conflated with concepts from other levels of explanation. Although it remains to be 
seen whether a functional analytic-abstractive language can be used to describe all of the 
phenomena that applied psychologists are studying, it is encouraging that analytical-
abstractive functional concepts have been used to describe an extensive range of lab-based 
and real-life phenomena (e.g., Catania, 2013; Cooper et al., 2007), including phenomena 
related to language and thought (e.g., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 4 
                                                                 
4 While pursuing this direction, care should be taken to keep functional and cognitive concepts clearly 
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 The benefits of creating a common language far outweigh its costs. Once the barriers 
between applied researchers have been torn down and a common functional language starts to 
develop, applied psychology can evolve into an integrated but diverse discipline that could be 
described as “psychological engineering”. 5 Within such a discipline, applied psychologists 
of all denominations can contribute to a joint body of knowledge that is formulated in a 
common language and can thus be consulted by all current and future applied psychologists. 
At the same time, applied research can remain diverse both in terms of the topics studied and 
in terms of the approaches that are adopted. As is the case in many types of engineering, 
within this diversity there would be a common core that all applied researchers could relate 
to. Hence, it might be appropriate to use the term “psychological engineering” to refer to this 
more integrated discipline. Although an increase in integration in no way hinges upon the use 
of the term “psychological engineering” and although this term might also have negative 
connotations for some, it does have the advantage of communicating the integrated nature of 
the discipline and of relating the discipline to other types of engineering. Just like the civil 
engineer shapes the physical world, so would the psychological engineer help shape the 
world of behavior. Just like all engineers, psychological engineers would need to be guided 
by ethical and societal values. In our opinion, the move toward such an integrated discipline 
of psychological engineering is highly desirable in light of the many problems that we 
currently face as individuals, as members of societies, and as a species. Many of these 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
separated. Cognitive researchers who currently use analytic-abstractive terms tend to interpret these terms in 
cognitive ways that go well beyond their original functional meaning . For instance, the terms reinforcer and 
reward are often used interchangeably even though the former one originally had a purely functional meaning 
(i.e., saying that a child-parent interaction is a reinforcer of tantrums attempts to explain why tantrums are 
frequent) whereas the latter is typically used in a cognitive manner (i.e., saying that child-parent interaction is a 
reward attempts to explain why it functions as a reinforcer). Conceptual rigor and training will be vital in 
building a common analytic-abstractive language. Unlike what is currently the case at most universities, 
psychology students need to be trained in evaluating the merits of scientific concepts and explanations, as well 
as educated about the basic principles of learning and behavior. 
5 Note that this term should not be confused with the term “engineering psychology”. Whereas the first one 
refers to a general approach that is not tied to a specific topic, the latter one is typically used to refer to one topic 
within applied psychology (i.e., the interaction between humans and their physical environment). 
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problems are inherently behavioral (in the broad sense of overt behavior and conscious 
thought) or the result of human behavior. Hence, applied psychologists have a vital role to 
play in solving them. We firmly believe that these problems can be tackled more efficiently if 
we strengthen the functional core that unites applied psychology.   
What Does it Mean to Adopt a Functional-Cognitive Framework? The Case of Applied 
Memory Research 
 Now that we have developed the argument in largely abstract terms, we discuss some 
of the implications of these ideas for applied memory research. For cognitively- inspired 
memory researchers, one of the most important implications is that they can benefit from 
describing phenomena and empirical findings as much as possible in terms of environment 
and behavior, that is, without using mental constructs (De Houwer, 2011). At first sight, it 
might seem difficult to construct functional descriptions of effects and findings in the 
(applied) memory literature simply because memory research seems to have an inherent focus 
on mental structures (e.g., memory stores) or mental processes (e.g., encoding and retrieval). 
However, because mental structures and processes cannot be observed directly, in practice, 
also knowledge about memory stores and memory processes can only be inferred from 
knowledge about environment-behavior relations. Therefore, it must be possible to describe 
memory research in functional terms. For instance, a substantial part of the vast literature on 
eyewitness testimony consists of studies that document the environmental factors (e.g., 
properties of lineup procedures) that moderate the match between past events (i.e., crimes) 
and current behavior (i.e., testimonies; see Busey & Loftus, 2007, for a review). A functional 
interpretation of memory research often requires little more than the realization that 
remembering can be conceived of as a behavioral phenomenon. Such a functional perspective 
also fits well with the idea that memory (i.e., remembering) can be shaped and trained in 
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much the same way as other behavior (e.g., Hertel, Maydon, Cottle, & Vrijsen, in press; 
Karpicke & Roediger, 2008).  
 Increased efforts to describe memory research in functional terms would reduce the 
use of proxies and thus help avoid the problems associated with this practice. Behavioral and 
other proxies of memory structures and processes are still common in the (applied) memory 
literature. For instance, at least initially, performance in implicit memory tasks was treated as 
a proxy of implicit memory (e.g., Schacter, 1987). It soon became clear, however, that 
performance on so-called implicit memory tasks often depends also on explicit memory. This 
led to the development of procedures to derive estimates of different memory processes from 
performance in different types of tasks (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) but also this approach has its 
problems and limitations (e.g., Dodson & Johnson, 1996). The likelihood of finding useful 
proxies for implicit memory is also reduced by conceptual and theoretical debates about what 
implicit memory actually entails (e.g., Butler & Berry, 2001). Although other, more recent 
distinctions in memory research (e.g., between verbatim and gist memory; see Reyna, Corbin, 
Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016) might become even more fruitful as the distinction between 
implicit and explicit memory, the example of implicit memory research reminds us of the 
risks of using proxies in memory research. Adopting a functional-cognitive framework can 
help reduce these risks because it encourages researchers to consistently describe phenomena 
in functional terms. For instance, from a functional perspective, implicit memory effects are 
behavioral effects of past events that occur under conditions of automaticity (see Hughes et 
al., 2012, for a more sophisticated functional analysis of implicit cognition). Systematically 
describing research on implicit memory in these terms allows researchers to study this 
behavioral phenomenon without adopting a priori assumptions about the mental mechanisms 
that underlie implicit memory (e.g., whether it involves a separate memory store or a specific 
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way of retrieving knowledge from a single memory store).  
 Developing functional definitions of the numerous phenomena that are studied in 
memory research could also increase coherence and cross-talk within that literature. For 
instance, imagine that many memory phenomena can be conceptualized as instances of 
remembering, that is, in terms of the impact of past events on current behavior. Different 
memory phenomena could then be classified with regard to the type of past environmental 
event, the type of current behavior, the type and properties of the organism that is involved, 
and the context in which the event and behavior occur (see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2013, for a similar analysis of learning research). 6 Undoubtedly, there will be debates about 
what counts as remembering (e.g., whether it makes sense to treat conscious thoughts about 
the past as if they are behaviors; see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, for a discussion) and thus 
about how far one can take this functional analysis of memory research. Our current aim is 
not to settle these discussions but merely to point out that often it is possible and beneficial to 
describe memory research in functional terms. 
 Adopting functional descriptions of cognitive research also highlights the fact that 
functional researchers can contribute to memory research. For instance, Guinther and 
Dougher (2010, 2014) initiated a line of research in which false memories are analyzed from 
a functional perspective. Their studies were based on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995) procedure but rather than using stimuli that were pre-
experimentally related, they used sets of unrelated words that were experimentally related 
                                                                 
6 From this perspective, remembering differs from learning in that learning entails only changes in behavior that 
are due to regularities in the environment (e.g., stimulus pairings) whereas remembering can involve also the 
effect of individual stimuli at a single moment in time on subsequent behavior (De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2013). Both learning and remembering differ from perceiving in that perceiving includes also immediate 
effects of environmental events on behavior whereas learning and remembering deal with the way that past 
environmental events moderate current behavior. This perspective implies that (a) learning always involves 
remembering and perceiving, (b) remembering always involves perceiving, (c) remembering does not always 
involve learning (i.e., when the past event is a single stimulus at a single moment in time), and (d) perceiving 
does not always involve learning or remembering (i.e., when only current events influence behavior). 
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using a procedure that is known to create classes of equivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are 
responded to as if they are similar). Earlier research had shown that functions of one stimulus 
(e.g., the capacity of a stimulus to elicit fear responses) can transfer to other stimuli that were 
trained to be equivalent. Guinther and Dougher set out to test whether the “remembering 
function” of a to-be-remembered stimulus (i.e., the capacity of a stimulus to elicit recall 
behavior) can also transfer to other stimuli that are trained to be equivalent to that stimulus. 
They did this by instructed participants to remember some of the stimuli from one class. 
During a subsequent free recall task, they found that false memories were more frequent for 
stimuli that were part of the same class as the to-be-remembered stimuli than for stimuli that 
were part of another class. The work of Guinther and Dougher nicely illustrates how 
functional researchers can take phenomena that were discovered by cognitive researchers and 
link those to known functional principles, thus extending the functional approach in new 
ways. Their results are also interesting for cognitively inspired researchers because they 
provide new ideas about the learning history that can produce false memories and the 
contextual variables that moderate false memories. Hence, the work of Guinther and Dougher 
can provide the starting point for applied memory research that is inspired not only by 
cognitive theories but also by general functional principles, that is, CIAA memory research.  
 In sum, adopting the functional-cognitive framework in practice means that (a) 
research is described as much as possible in terms of environment-behavior relations and (b) 
that researchers seek guidance not only at the level of explanation at which they choose to 
operate but also at the other level.  
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we provided a functional-cognitive perspective on the current state and 
possible future of applied psychology. In essence, adopting this perspective reveals unity in 
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diversity. Simultaneously, it clarifies how different types of applied research differ as well as 
what they all have in common. It does not intervene in the choice of practical problems or 
solutions that applied researchers study, nor does it discourage them from seeking guidance at 
levels of explanation other than the functional one. It does, however, highlight the common 
functional core of applied psychology and reveals a future in which applied psychology as a 
whole can be fortified by strengthening this core. Although we realize that the functional-
cognitive perspective is just one of many possible perspectives on applied psychology, we 
hope that our paper revealed some of the potential of this perspective and will thus stimulate 
discussion on the current state and future of this vital part of psychological science.  
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Appendix 1. 
Two caveats are worth noting with regard to the claim that all applied research is 
functional in nature. First, although applied researchers might not strive to understand mental 
mechanisms for its own sake, often they do want to change mental processes. Hence, one 
might argue that this type of applied research is situated at the cognitive level. In many cases, 
however, changing mental processes is just a means to toward solving a behavioral problem 
(e.g., strengthening executive control in order to combat substance abuse). Although the 
interventions are inspired by cognitive theories, they are functional because they change the 
environment with the ultimate aim of changing behavior (e.g., practicing mental span tasks to 
reduce substance abuse; e.g., Shipstead et al., 2012). In other cases, the ultimate goal of 
applied researchers is to change conscious thoughts and feelings (e.g., reducing intrusive 
thoughts and negative feelings after a traumatic event to increase psychological wellbeing). 
Also these interventions can be situated at the functional level in at least two ways. First, 
conscious thoughts and feelings can and have been thought of as behavioral phenomena (i.e., 
covert behavior; see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Without entering into philosophical debates 
about the potential merits of this idea, it is therefore possible to argue that the aim to change 
conscious thoughts and feelings fits within a functional approach. Second,  as noted above, 
the actual research will always be functional in nature. A researcher can influence the 
thoughts and feelings of another organism only by intervening in the physical environment 
(e.g., by producing sound waves such as spoken words that the organism can interpret). 
Moreover, researchers cannot directly observe changes in the conscious thoughts or feelings 
of other organisms but can only make inferences about those changes on the basis of overt 
behavior of the organism (including verbal self-reports). Hence, also when the aim is to 
change conscious thoughts and feelings, applied researchers are bound to the functional level, 
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that is, to interventions in the environment and the observation of changes in overt behavior.   
As a second caveat, it is important to note that researchers can have multiple aims. 
For instance, researchers can sometimes strive to develop cognitive models for their own sake 
(i.e., cognitive research in the strict sense), while at other times develop those models in order 
to solve practical problems (i.e., cognitively- inspired functional research), and on still other 
occasions be focused only on environment-behavior relations (purely functional research). In 
that sense, an individual researcher can take on different roles. Nevertheless, when someone 
takes on the role of an applied researcher, it seems to us that he or she would look for mental 
mechanisms only as a means towards solving practical problems at the functional level. 
When a researcher only pays lip-service to the ultimate goal of solving problems, questions 
can be raised about whether that researcher functions as an applied researcher. Hence, when 
applied researchers adopt an immediate, proximal goal to uncover mental mechanisms, they 
need to constantly and critically evaluate whether that goal continues to serve the ultimate, 
distal goal of solving practical problems and need to abandon the proximal goal when there is 
little reason to believe that it serves the distal goal.   
 
 
  
 
